the Affordable Care Act (ACA) are enormous. The outcome of the 2010 congressional elections may well determine whether this land mark legislation succeeds or fails. Whatever the electoral outcome, the political battle over health care reform will continue into the 2012 presidential elections and probably beyond.
The evidence of party polariza tion is overwhelming (see table) . 1 A majority of both parties ended up voting for the original Social Security Act, although Republi cans had campaigned actively against it. Many members of both parties voted for the legislation that created Medicare and Medi caid, that revamped welfare, and that created Medicare drug cov erage (Part D). Not so in 2010. Heavy Democratic majorities but not one Republican in the House or Senate voted for the ACA.
Although current political po larization is extraordinary, it is the substantive policy differences that have raised the stakes in the 2010 election. The most urgent question is how -or even whether -the ACA will be im plemented.
The ACA is nothing if not am bitious. It proposes to enroll tens of millions of people in private health insurance plans through yettobecreated health insurance exchanges. It will provide mil lions of Americans with subsidies tied to income and health insur ance costs. It will greatly expand Medicaid. It will set and enforce standards for private insurance. It will expand comparativeeffec tiveness research and accelerate the application of health infor mation technology. It will create a new commission to oversee Medicare. It will field experiments and pilot programs to help con trol spending. And this menu is but a partial listing of the provi sions of the 906page bill. If per mitted to run its course, the ACA promises to transform the U.S. health care system. But successful implementation poses remarkable challenges and will require ade quate funding, enormous ingenu ity, and goodwill from federal and state officials, as well as cooper ation from private insurers, busi nesses, and private citizens. 2 Republican opponents of the ACA have promised to seek its re peal. Although they oppose the mandated coverage and large new subsidies of the law, they promise to preserve its widely popular in surancemarket reforms, includ ing rules barring insurers from denying or canceling coverage and limits on the variation of insur ance premiums. In reality, however, this prom ise cannot be sustained without also retaining mandatory subsi dized coverage. If insurers must sign up anyone who applies for coverage, and if variation in pre miums is limited, people would have a powerful incentive to wait until the onset of serious illness to buy insurance at the regulated price. Such behavior would make it financially impossible for in surers to survive. Thus, sustain ing insurancemarket reforms vir tually forces the government to implement a requirement that people carry insurance. And to make such a mandate affordable, subsidies are necessary to avoid causing gross hardship. In brief, the pledge to keep insurancemar ket reforms without both man dated coverage and subsidies is untenable.
The Midterm Elections -High Stakes for Health Policy
Repeal of the ACA before 2013 is unlikely. Both houses of Con gress would have to enact repeal legislation, which President Barack Obama would surely veto. Then, two thirds of both houses would have to vote to override that veto. After 2012, however, repeal could occur if Republicans win the White House and both houses of Congress and stick by their pledge.
A more serious possibility is that ACA opponents could deliver on another pledge: to cut off fund ing for implementation. 3 Here is how such a process could work.
Customarily, substantive legis lation "authorizes" spending, but the funds to be spent must be separately "appropriated." The ACA contains 64 specific authoriza tions to spend up to $105.6 billion and 51 general authorizations to spend "such sums as are neces sary" over the period between 2010 and 2019. None of these funds will flow, however, unless Congress enacts specific appro priation bills. In addition, section 1005 of the ACA appropriated $1 billion to support the cost of implementation in the Depart ment of Health and Human Ser vices (DHHS). This sum is a small fraction of the $5 billion to $10 billion that the Congressional Budget Office estimates the fed eral government will require be tween 2010 and 2019 to imple ment the ACA. 4 The ACA appro priated nothing for the Internal Revenue Service, which must col lect the information needed to compute subsidies and pay them. The ACA also provides unlimited funding for grants to states to support the creation of health in surance exchanges (section 1311). But states will also incur sub stantially increased administrative costs to enroll millions of newly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries. Without large additional appro priations, implementation will be crippled.
If ACA opponents gain a ma jority in either house of Congress, they could not only withhold needed appropriations but also bar the use of whatever funds are appropriated for ACA imple mentation, including the imple mentation of the provisions re quiring individual people to buy insurance or businesses to offer it. They could bar the use of staff time for designing rules for implementation or for paying sub sidies to support the purchase of insurance. They could even bar the DHHS from writing or issu ing regulations or engaging in any other federal activity related to the creation of health insur ance exchanges, even though the ACA provides funds for the DHHS to make grants to the states to set up those exchanges.
That would set the stage for a highstakes game of political "chicken." The president could veto an appropriation bill con taining such language. Congress could refuse to pass appropria tion bills without such language. Failure to appropriate funds would lead to a partial government shut down. In 1994, leaders of the Re publican Congress who pursued a similar tactic during the Clinton administration lost the ensuing publicrelations war. In the cur rent environment, however, one cannot be certain how political blame -or credit -for such a governmental closure would be apportioned or which side would blink first.
Whatever the outcome of such a political contretemps, debate over the ACA is certain to con tinue. Opponents can take politi cal comfort in polls reporting that nearly half of Americans say that Congress should repeal most of the ACA and replace it with some thing else. 5 Since most major pro visions of the ACA do not take effect until January 1, 2014, delay ing tactics might eventually en able repeal. Electoral gains in 2010 will embolden ACA oppo nents. They will continue the fight on into the 2012 presidential and congressional campaigns. To be sure, this debate would give ACA supporters the chance to dispel the confusion and correct the misinformation on which much of the public opposition to the law is based.
Perhaps the more likely -and in some ways more troublingpossibility is that the effort to repeal the bill will not succeed, but the tactic of crippling imple mentation will. The nation would then be left with zombie legisla tion, a program that lives on but works badly, consisting of poor ly funded and understaffed state health exchanges that cannot bring needed improvements to the individual and smallgroup insurance markets, clumsily ad ministered subsidies that lead to needless resentment and confu sion, and mandates that are ca priciously enforced.
Such an outcome would trou ble ACA opponents: their goal is repeal. It would trouble ACA sup porters: they want the law to work. But it should terrify every one. The strategy of consciously undermining a law that has been enacted by Congress and signed by the president might conceiv ably be politically fruitful in the short term, but as a style of gov ernment it is a recipe for a dys functional and failed republic.
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